Quantum entanglement as an interpretation of bosonic character in composite two-particle systems

We consider a composite particle formed by two fermions or two bosons. We discover that composite behavior is deeply related to the quantum entanglement between the constituent particles. By analyzing the properties of creation and annihilation operators, we show that bosonic character emerges if the constituent particles become strongly entangled. Such a connection is demonstrated explicitly in a class of two-particle wave functions

Lean Limit Phenomena

The influence of stretch and preferential diffusion on premixed flame extinction and stability was investigated via two model flame configurations, namely the stagnation flame and the bunsen flame. Using a counterflow burner and a stagnation flow burner with a water-cooled wall, the effect of downstream heat loss on the extinction of a stretched premixed flame investigated for lean and rich propane/air and methane/air mixtures. It was demonstrated that extinction by stretch alone is possible only when the deficient reactant is the less mobile one. When it is the more mobile one, downstream heat loss or incomplete reaction is also needed to achieve extinction. The local extinction of bunsen flame tips and edges of hydrocarbon/air premixtures was investigated using a variety of burners. Results show that, while for both rich propane/air and butane/air mixtures tip opening occurs at a constant fuel equivalence ratio of 1.44 and is therefore independent of the intensity, uniformity, and configuration of the approach flow, for rich methane/air flames burning is intensified at the tip and therefore opening is not possible

Is Human Virtue a Civic Virtue? A Reading of Aristotle's Politics 3.4

Is the virtue of the good citizen the same as the virtue of the good man? Aristotle addresses this in Politics 3.4. His answer is twofold. On the one hand, (the account for Difference) they are not the same both because what the citizen’s virtue is depends on the constitution, on what preserves it, and on the role the citizen plays in it, and because the good citizens in the best constitution cannot all be good men, whereas the good man’s virtue is uniform. On the other hand, (the account for Identity) the two virtues are identical in the good men in the best constitution, in which all are good citizens, each possessing the ability for ruling and for being ruled. This nuanced answer can be seen as Aristotle’s synthesis of a Periclean view (contribution to state blots out personal wrongs) and a Socratic view (no good citizen is without justice). Its nuances reflect the extent to which Aristotle’s conceptions of good citizenship and the best constitution accommodate deviations of what is probable from the human ideal set out in his ethical writings. In the present chapter, I will first address three puzzles regarding the nuances of Aristotle’s answer. Second, I will consider one question about its implication: Does Aristotle’s account for Difference turn out to entail something ultra-Periclean: that no one can simultaneously be a good man and a good citizen in any constitution other than the best? I shall argue the negative